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O Apropriação da renda por empreendedores rurais:
três experiências na produção de café no Brasil
A questão que norteia esse trabalho é se existem estratégias factíveis
e sustentáveis que possibilitem reverter a queda da renda agrícola
dos produtores de pequena escala. Para respondê-la, analisa-se
como os empresários escolhem estratégias que criam e capturam
valor, com o objetivo de apresentar um modelo de análise de dife-
renciação no segmento. Quatro perspectivas teóricas são apresen-
tadas: Posicionamento Estratégico, Visão Baseada em Recursos,
Economia dos Custos de Transação e Teoria do Lucro de Knight.
Baseadas no modelo, três experiências estratégicas do sistema
agroindustrial do café brasileiro são examinadas, divididas em três
categorias: interdependência conjunta, que apresenta o foco estra-
tégico de criação de valor por meio da exportação direta de café de
boa qualidade adotado pela Cooperativa Regional de Produtores
de Café (Cooxupé); interdependência sequencial, que examina a
estratégia de marca de qualidade da torrefadora illycaffè; inter-
dependência mútua, na qual a experiência dos produtores de Poço
Fundo é analisada, visando agregar valor ao café com base no
mercado de café sustentável. Observa-se que a estratégia mais
bem-sucedida em termos de representação (número de produtores
envolvidos) é aquela que enfoca escala e escopo na comercialização
de cafés especiais. Outro achado interessante diz respeito ao novo
paradigma na relação entre o setor rural e o segmento à jusante, em
relação à qualidade da bebida e às questões de sustentabilidade.
Palavras-chave: estratégias de agregação de valor, análise de
posicionamento estratégico, visão baseada em
recursos, economia dos custos de transação, teoria
knightiana, agronegócio café.
1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to answer the question of whether there are
sustainable, economically feasible strategies that are able to ensure that the
rent created in the rural sector can be appropriated by rural entrepreneurs. Two
Rent appropriation among rural entrepreneurs:
three experiences in coffee production in Brazil
Maria Sylvia Macchione Saes
Maria Sylvia Macchione Saes, Doutora em Economia
pela Universidade de São Paulo, é Professora do
Departamento de Administração da Faculdade de
Economia, Administração e Contabilidade da
Universidade de São Paulo (CEP 05508-010 – São
Paulo/SP, Brasil) e Membro do PENSA – Programa
de Estudos dos Negócios do Sistema Agroindustrial da
Fundação Instituto de Administração.
E-mail: ssaes@usp.br
Endereço:
Universidade de São Paulo
FEA – Departamento de Administração
Avenida Professor Luciano Gualberto, 908
Cidade Universitária – Butantã
05508-010 – São Paulo – SP
Recebido em 14/agosto/2009
Aprovado em 18/agosto/2010
Sistema de Avaliação: Double Blind Review
Editor Científico: Nicolau Reinhard
This is an Open Access article under the CC BY license. 
314 R.Adm., São Paulo, v.45, n.4, p.313-327, out./nov./dez. 2010
Maria Sylvia Macchione Saes
main motivations have driven this work. The first is theoretical,
since in orthodox economics the role of the rural entrepreneur
in economic activity has long been ignored, although the
concept of entrepreneur, originally rooted in Cantillon’s work,
emerged a couple of centuries ago (ELKJAER, 1991). Orthodox
economics focuses mainly on the competitive equilibrium of
the market. This framework establishes what are generally called
the price taker and perfect knowledge assumptions. Buyer
and seller both having perfect knowledge in the market adjust
his/her response to market prices perfectly and as a result market
equilibrium is promptly achieved. Therefore, there is no room
for time lags and the functional role of entrepreneurs. However,
such an approach ignores the numerous examples of pioneers
who opened agricultural frontiers and the willingness of indi-
vidual producers to adopt new technologies and obtain dif-
ferentiated rents. As Casson (2005, p.116) argues, neglecting
the entrepreneurial dimension offers a partial explanation for
the behavior of the firm. On the other hand, focusing only on
the entrepreneur also only tells part of the story.
The second motivation relates to private and public poli-
cies, since the general declining trend in the agricultural
sector’s share in national income generated by supply chains
is a challenge. This challenge goes beyond the dichotomy
between rich and poor countries. Although it is more pressing
for undeveloped countries, the issue of declining income in
the agricultural sector is not the prerogative of producers from
poor countries. In undeveloped countries declining agricultural
income is, by and large, conducive to an impoverished economy.
For developed countries, although this problem is solved by
the allocation of the large resources provided by public poli-
cies, the ill-fated results of these transfers and the dissatisfac-
tion of society, which pays for regulation inefficiencies, raise
the issue of the unsustainability of artificially maintaining pro-
ducers’ income.
Recent studies (FITTER and KAPLINSKY, 2001) argue that
de-commoditization through product differentiation attributes
is the only way to avoid price-competition in the agricultural
sector, allowing it to obtain extraordinary rents. Thus, in order
to answer how rural entrepreneurs choose a strategy that
creates and captures value, we build a model to analyze dif-
ferentiation strategy in the rural sphere.
Our model integrates four complementary strategy theories:
• Strategic Positioning Analysis (SPA), focused on the product
market;
• Resource-Based View (RBV), mainly focused on a firm’s
internal factors;
• Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), concerned with the
coordination of entrepreneurial activities;
• Knight’s Theory of Profit (KTP), which explains the appear-
ance of rents in a situation of disequilibrium.
The second section of this article addresses the way in
which economic literature discusses sustainable competitive
advantages. The third section introduces our analysis model.
The fourth part describes three experiences in Brazil’s
agricultural coffee sector according to the model presented.
Finally, a comparison is made between them and some
considerations and suggestions are put forward.
2. HOW ARE SUSTAINABLE COMPETITIVE
ADVANTAGES (SCAs) GAINED?
Looking at the issue through four complementary theor-
etical lenses, this section aims to address the question: How
do entrepreneurs choose a strategy that creates and captures
value? Once that has been accomplished, an endeavor is made
to integrate the four approaches presented.
The most traditional strategic view is Porter’s Strategic
Positioning Analysis (SPA). It states that companies must ob-
serve the competitive interactions with their immediate and
potential rivals. Such a strategy involves the creation of entry
barriers (economies of scale, economies of scope and differen-
tiation) to old and new competitors in consuming countries.
This strategy of creating entry barriers reflects a particular
view of how markets work, having as a paradigm the perfect
competition model, in which the only source of profit is the
creation of monopoly rents (PORTER, 1985; CHANDLER, 1998;
PORTER, 1998).
The Resource-Based View (RBV)(1) argues that compa-
nies must develop and benefit from internal differentiated
resources. In this case, in order to maintain SCAs, the firm’s
strategy consists in identifying, developing and emphasizing
its capabilities, so that its rivals are unable to imitate them. The
source of value comes from Ricardian rents (RUMELT, 1984;
WERNERFELT, 1984; BARNEY, 1991; RUMELT, 1991;
PETERAF, 1993).
In the perspective of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE)
firms adopt differentiated governance structures with the aim
of reducing transaction costs. Since value creation results
from trade, transaction costs can prevent exchanges from
being made, or make them more expensive. So value is created
when transaction costs are reduced through governance
structures that allow for better coordination between agents
(WILLIAMSON, 1985; WILLIAMSON, 1996), or make it
possible to explore, previously unexplored attributes of goods
through the redefinition of property rights (BARZEL, 2002).
Finally, Knight’s Theory of Profit (KTP) proposes that
competitiveness depends on the entrepreneur’s judgment
(KNIGHT, 1964; FOSS and KLEIN, 2004; FOSS, 2005). This
judgment is characterized by its uniqueness, due to a subjective
evaluation (made by the entrepreneur) concerning future gains.
The importance of this approach lies in the fact that it includes
uncertainty within its scope, in addition to highlighting the
role played by the agent who decides which strategies the firm
will use. An interesting implication arising from this is that,
even in the absence of information asymmetry, economic agents
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(entrepreneurs) will disagree on the best way of allocating
resources, since interpreting reality depends upon their
personal judgment about the future, which reflects on the firms’
heterogeneity. The consolidation of the main features of these
theories is presented in Table 1.
It can be noted that all the theories here presented provide
only a partial view of how firms can create and capture value
(FOSS, 2005). According to Nickerson (2003), both SPA and
RBV fail to take into consideration the costs of organizing
activities internally, which may imply the adoption of costly
strategies to capture value. In addition, from the perspective
of the RBV, managers will not capture value if their unique
resources are not valuable to consumers. Concerning TCE,
the main criticism regards the fact that a strategy that econo-
mizes transaction costs may fail to capture or create value
because of limited demand or excessive competition. KTP fails
because it does not provide an understanding of the rationality
of decision-makers when choosing problem solutions for
putting into place an idealized strategy (NICKERSON and
ZENGER, 2004). Integrating these views could, therefore,
minimize the deficiencies found in each, thereby providing a
theoretical instrument that would allow for a better understand-
ing of the SCAs. An integrative view allows for an under-
standing of how the firm’s strategy of value creation (Ricardian/
monopolistic rents) aligns with its governance structure in the
supply chain (how property rights are allocated) and how value
appropriation will be determined.
The following aspect is particularly important to our
research problem: there is no use in formulating a value creation
strategy if, when the transaction is carried out, the value is
transferred to the upstream segment. In other words, residual
property rights must be allocated in such a way as to allow
agricultural producers to capture value. Therefore, the value
that the producer will appropriate along the supply chain not
only depends upon the firm’s ability to exclude non-proprietors
and enforce its own rights; it also depends on how bargaining
power is established between the parties.
In order to integrate the four approaches we looked for
inspiration in Nickerson and Zenger (2004). They depart from
the Transaction Cost Economics’ approach to argue that the
discovery of opportunities by the entrepreneur involves two
aspects: identifying problems, which, if solved, create value;
and governing the organization to allow for the creation of a
continuous process of solution search.
The efficient organization depends on the type of solution
search required (NICKERSON and ZENGER, 2004). For the
Table 1
Main Features of the SPA, RBV, TCE and KTP Views
Theoretical
Views
SPA
RBV
TCE
KTP
Unit of
Analysis
Value chain
Resources(*)
Transaction
(WILLIAMSON,
1985; 1996)
Property rights
(BARZEL, 2002)
Human action
Variables that Define Firm
Competitiveness
Entry barriers:
• Economies of scale and scope
• Differentiation
Scarce resources, expensive to
transfer and to replicate
Alignment between governance
structure and transaction
attributes: asset specificity,
frequency; uncertainty
Alignment between governance
structure and costs of measuring
the attributes of the goods
Entrepreneur’s cognitive
characteristics / learning
Sources of Competitive
Advantage
Monopoly power
Ricardian rents
Reduction of transaction
costs
Maximize transaction value
Entrepreneur’s judgment
Critical Points
• Ignores different firm
performances within the same
industry
• Does not explain the
boundaries of the firms
• Ignores firm’s external
environment (demand)
• Has no capacity to predict
• Ignores gains resulting from
team production
• Ignores firm’s heterogeneity
• There is no economic logic
behind the entrepreneurial
decision
Note: * The unit of analysis under the RBV is not consensual; it includes other definitions such as: activities, strategies, processes, routines, capabilities and
core competences, among others.
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authors, there are three alternative and opposing forms of
organization associated with the problems, according to their
degree of complexity:
• problems of reduced complexity (decomposable) – the
entrepreneur ideally looks for it’s a solution for them via the
market;
• problems of moderate complexity (nearly decomposable) –
the entrepreneur ideally deals with the search within the
limits of the firm, using his or her authority (or fiat);
• problems that are highly complex (non-decomposable) – he
or she ideally looks for a solution by creating a consensus-
-oriented organization, in which socialization is used to create
a common communication code by which knowledge can be
economically aggregated.
These authors point out that the discovery of valuable
opportunities usually requires choices involving multiple
knowledge sets about the project and that marketing them
encompasses different characteristics of the agents. Only in
small operations can a single entrepreneur know precisely
which decision and which choices to make about planning,
manufacturing, finance, accounting, marketing, human re-
sources and strategy activities. When problems are complex
and non-decomposable, the authors argue that the firm will
acquire a specific feature, while creating a favorable envir-
onment for knowledge sharing. The entrepreneurs will have
to organize the firm in order to create its own culture and
identity, thereby favoring knowledge sharing and a search
heuristic.
The proposition presented by Nickerson and Zenger (2004)
provides reflections for the analysis of supply chains, even
though the article mentioned here centers on strategic solutions
regarding the firm, as will be seen in the next section.
3. SUSTAINABLE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES
IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR: AN
ANALYTICAL PROPOSAL
The analytical scheme of value creation or and appropriation
is presented in Figure 1.
In our model, the entrepreneur-producer initially discovers
a value creation opportunity for his or her business (Figure 1
[1]). This opportunity (problem identification) relies on the
creation or exploration of the new attributes of productive
resources (Figure 1 [2]). In this situation, there will always be
two elements of uncertainty. The first relates to the need to
estimate all production operations from beginning to end. It is
impossible to state precisely what the result of a production
activity will be in physical terms (quantity and/or quality) before
the resources actually enter the production process.
The second element regards the need to forecast the wishes
of the consumers towards whom a good is directed. Producers
must estimate: the future demand they intend to meet and the
future result of their operation aimed at meeting this demand
Figure 1: Analytical Scheme of Value Creation and Appropriation
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(technology direction management and production control).
Such activities are directly connected with the SPA strategy,
and, therefore, are conditioned by the structure and competition
pattern of the industry within which the firm operates (Figure
1 [3]).
In the agricultural sector, in general, as entrepreneur-
-producers do not have scale, the adoption of an individual
strategy will have to take into consideration the transaction
costs (Figure 1 [4]) of a collective action. They will have to
persuade producers in their neighborhood to adhere to the
strategy with a view to obtaining scale, which will allow them
to fulfill their aim. The analysis of the transaction costs of
vertical coordination will be jointly analyzed with the horizon-
tal strategy (Figure 1 [5] and [6]), id est once the profile of the
resource necessary to achieve the objective has been defined,
the horizontal production strategies and vertical strategies for
selling the product must be integrated.
It needs to be emphasized that the definition of horizontal
and vertical strategies is rather complex: other people do not
easily adopt an innovative strategy that is the brainchild of an
entrepreneur-producer. A person creating or discovering new
attributes is motivated to use them directly because it is costly
to transfer knowledge that is not easily measurable. There are
costs associated with discovering the relevant price and costs
for negotiating, measuring unknown attributes and formulating
contracts. Therefore, entrepreneurs usually avoid negotiation
costs in order to prevent value dissipation. They cannot
become idea sellers, since knowledge is susceptible to prob-
lems of moral hazard and adverse selection(2). In addition
collective action could take several forms and, hence, must be
aligned with the strategy as conceived.
Based on the model of Nickerson and Zenger (2004) and
on the taxonomy adopted by Lazzarini, Chaddad and Cook
(2001), it is possible to indicate three classical types of
coordination that exist between rural producers for solving
value-creation problems, namely: joint interdependence, which
is associated with a reduced complexity (decomposable)
problem; sequential interdependence, related with an moderate
complexity (nearly decomposable) problem; mutual interde-
pendence, which concerns a high complexity (non-decom-
posable) problem. Each of these problems requires different
solutions, which implies different resource profiles. Each
resource profile defines organizational arrangements, which
will generate attributes that are consistent with the target
positioning.
At the end of the supply chain, consumers will respond to
the strategic choice by buying products, based on the asso-
ciation between their preferences and the utility of the product,
id est analyzing the costs and benefits of the products offered
via the strategies they have available (NICKERSON, 2003). In
other words, it is the consumer who will ultimately validate
value-creation strategies and determine the value that can be
appropriated.
Therefore, value appropriation (Figure 1 [8]) will depend
on demand elasticity (how much consumers are willing to
pay for the product), id est the total value created and how
property rights between agents are allocated. The definition
of property rights will depend upon the governance structures
(Figure 1 [7]).
The three types of structure that are consistent with the
complexity of the problems, in terms of value-creation strategies,
are as follows:
• Joint interdependence
In this case, each producer within a group makes an au-
tonomous and well-defined contribution to a given task.
Relationships between agents are rare and social ties are
weak. This represents the reduced complexity, or decompos-
able, type of problem. Prices reflect the totality of invest-
ments required. Producer cooperatives, for instance, repre-
sent a type of solution for dealing with problems of this
nature. Standardization, which can be obtained through
certification, is a key instrument for solving problems of
information asymmetry. Though there is a differentiation
strategy, producers have little power to influence product
prices, which are defined by the market. As Barzel (2002)
puts it, while it reduces the cost of obtaining information
about the attributes of the goods, standardization brings
the worlds of costly information and perfect competition
closer together. This is why producers make more use of
the externalities of networks (reduced transaction costs)
for obtaining competitive gains than of price differentials.
The appropriate vertical governance structure is the mar-
ket. Even if producers were to possess processing means
through a cooperative, their power to appropriate value
would be limited. An example of this would be a value-aggre-
gation strategy, based on the sale of a product with stand-
ardized quality.
• Sequential interdependence
This type of interdependence occurs when a producer’s
strategy is directly related to the specific investment of an
upstream firm that will determine the conditions for the
organization of production. In this case, with regard to the
complexity of the problem, the type of solution is moderate.
Hierarchy-based authority is necessary to prevent the
dispersion of strategic information. Residual decision rights
are allocated to the upstream firm, which carries out the
coordination through planning and adaptation to changes
in the external environment. Since the firm is responsible
for the decision of the whole network of relationships, the
solution is trivial (SAUVÉE, 2002). In marginal terms, the
result of this type of governance structure can be more
advantageous for rural producers, compared with the result
obtained through joint interdependence, since there is
value creation to be negotiated. It is worth observing that
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when this type of strategy is started by a rural producer, it
is more feasible when the producer also owns the pro-
cessing firm upstream, because if not the producer has to
persuade an entrepreneur to invest in the processing of
the product. Since the focus of this work is on small
producers, this strategy is more commonly adopted by a
processing firm. A case illustrating this example is a pro-
cessing firm’s brand strategy with regard to the specific
quality of a product.
• Mutual interdependence
In this case, each agent is mutually dependent on the
choices and actions carried out by other agents. Decision
rights are distributed among rural producers, which implies
the presence of a complex solution process. Since it is not
a trivial problem, a consensus mechanism is presupposed,
as well as a negotiation between the parties and a mutual
adjustment (MENARD, 2004; ZYLBERSZTAJN, 2005). The
coordination and adaptation forms require learning through
feedback rather than through centralized decision-making
planning. Due to their complexity (and, therefore, the
difficulty in duplicating them), the resources created by
this mechanism make for a better appropriation of the margin
by rural producers. Therefore, if the firm’s performance
depends on the resources it controls, the meaning of its
existence derives from its relative greater ability, when
compared with other governance structures (market and
contracts), to generate and appropriate economic rents
(RUMET, 1984; WERNERFELT, 1984). An example that
illustrates this case is that of a brand strategy in the rural
segment, in general not related to its origin and regional
quality. Since it involves several producers, exclusion rules
must be clear and consensual, and there are problems with
free riders.
Therefore, we see that the definition of vertical and hori-
zontal organizational strategies is based on the value creation
opportunities devised by entrepreneurs. Table 2 consolidates
this discussion.
In the first case, the market is the most expected form to be
seen, since there is no way to improve the distribution of the
producers’ value through the adoption of hybrid forms or
forward vertical integration (acquisition of a processing firm).
In fact, cooperatives that adopt such integration strategies
start behaving in a similar fashion to processing firms, which
aim at competing in the market. The capacity to appropriate
value is nil and gains result from economies of scale and scope.
In the second case, in which the firm’s brand is an important
strategy, hybrid forms are expected to be more commonly
observed, and relational or formal contracts or even hierarchy
may occur, depending on the type of resource that is related to
the brand. Gain will result from the use of differentiated
resources and the creation of entry barriers in the product
market. The value will tend to stay with the agent that holds
the residual decision rights (or the strategy’s coordinating
agent). In this latter case, more complex coordination me-
chanisms are necessary for dealing with problems resulting
from joint actions. More complex coordination mechanisms
mean consensual decision-making and responsibility sharing.
As the strategy is shared among the agents, value division
will also tend to be.
The next section will analyze the three strategies, based
on the examples of three experiences in the Brazilian coffee
system.
Table 2
Value Creation and Appropriation
Types of Governance Allocation
Problem Appropriate to of Property Market Capacity to Strategy Gains
Identified Profile of Rights Conditions Appropriate Value (SCAs)
Resources
Low Joint Market Low entry Nil Economies of scale
complexity interdependence barriers and scope/efficiency
Average Sequential Authority High entry Total, for the Ricardian/
complexity interdependence (one of the barrier: focus on agent with monopolistic rents
segments) consumer loyalty authority
High Mutual High entry Shared Ricardian/
complexity interdependence Shared barrier: focus on among agents monopolistic rents
unique resources
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4. VALUE CREATION AND APPROPRIATION:
SPECIALTY COFFEES IN BRAZIL
This section aims to discuss experiences that allow the
theoretical platform presented to be illustrated. These expe-
riences have been grouped into three categories:
• Joint interdependence, designed to examine the strategic
focus on value creation in the Coffee Growers Regional Coop-
erative (Cooperativa Regional de Cafeicultores em Gua-
xupé – Cooxupé), located in the state of Minas Gerais, Brazil.
• Sequential interdependence, looking at the exceptional
quality coffee brand created by the illycaffè roaster’s owner.
Such a strategy required an action for targeting coordination
of the supply chain in Brazil.
• Mutual interdependence, related to the experience of coffee
growers from a region called Poço Fundo, also located in the
state of Minas Gerais, Brazil. This community has recorded
actions from growers that aim to add value to their coffee,
based on the sustainable brands market.
4.1. Joint interdependence: Cooxupé making progress on a
social network path
Having stepped into the role of Cooxupé’s CEO at the age
of 46, Isaac Ferreira Leite, known as Dr. Isaac, was driven by
his goal of finding ways of adding value to coffee, as a result
of which Brazilian growers’ remuneration could be enhanced
(SAES, 1995). To this end, the entrepreneurial vision he
conveyed to others conferred a quite peculiar and innovative
aspect to this strategy. Dr. Isaac brought to Cooxupé his
observations about the dynamics of large firms, which includ-
ed, for instance, gains in economies of scale and scope in
textile manufacturing, as well as a professional work ethic in
the workplace and in negotiations with clients. This happened
at a time when Brazilian cooperatives placed almost no emphasis
on professional management, and, even less, on internation-
alization strategies.
It also needs to be borne in mind that Brazilian agricultural
cooperatives are widely disseminated economic structures and
often seen as tools for the development of rural areas. The
main argument in defense of the cooperative form is precisely
what led to the creation of Cooxupé, namely, the competitive
nature of the primary sector that interacts up and downstream
in highly oligopolized markets. To balance these forces, a union
of rural producers makes for a decrease in business risks and
the adding of value to their products, which would be unattain-
able if an individual approach were taken (BIALOSKORSKI
NETO, 1994).
Cooxupé profited from both Brazil’s economic boom and
the incentives of the agricultural policy during the so-called
economic miracle years, in the 1960s and 1970s. It expanded
its infrastructure and the number of members, while advancing
into other Brazilian regions. It acquired storage facilities, coffee
processing equipment, warehouses and regional offices, there-
by creating better conditions for benefiting from the external-
ities of the network, both in the purchase of inputs and in the
negotiation of green coffee.
One of the first actions of the cooperative in this period
was in March 1965, when it acquired a warehouse with a capac-
ity for storing 200,000 bags of coffee, which was financed by
the Brazilian Coffee Institute (Instituto Brasileiro do Café –
IBC) (CHADDAD, 2007). Able to stockpile their coffee, pro-
ducers could choose the best moment to sell it, thereby increas-
ing their negotiating power with buyers. In 2008, Cooxupé had
18 warehouses and storage capacity for 1.9 million 60 kilogram
bags, and with capacity to receive over 3 million bags per year.
Another advantage of the storage system has to do with the
acquisition of inputs. By acquiring inputs in large volumes
and being able to stock them in the periods between crop
seasons, the cooperative could resell them to its members at a
lower price than the market price.
Therefore, what distinguishes Cooxupé from other coffee
coops is Dr. Isaac’s strategic proposal concerning the means
for marketing the product. Cooperatives used to export coffee
only with the support of third parties. Though the practice of
exporting indirectly was not generally contested, Dr. Isaac did
not approve of it. That is, if discovering opportunities means
identifying problems, he certainly had discovered some: Why
did Brazilian cooperatives have to rely on exporters? Why not
export directly? Why not standardize coffee quality to add
value to it instead of leaving this task to the buyers?
Anticipating the world market trend of segmentation by
quality, Cooxupé built tools and processes aimed at classifying
the coffee being traded in the 1950s, and hence brought
consistency to the standardization of its product. This system
was adopted at a time when the priority of government policy
was the volume of coffee exports, which was detrimental to
product quality. This pioneering initiative allowed Cooxupé to
develop unique resources for trading coffee directly with
international buyers in the 1980s.
Product standardization, therefore, was the first step toward
changing the rules of the game that established how the coop’s
coffee was exported. This was important because, over time,
buyers adapted to this system, even when purchasing the
product through third parties. Dr. Isaac believed that success
in direct exports would be achieved through the creation of a
long-term relationship based on trust and reputation and, of
course, the quality of the product.
In 1984, the cooperative opened an office in the city of
Santos, the world’s main coffee exporting port. In 1990, export
director Joaquim Libânio took over, with responsibility for
developing the relationship, a task facilitated by his previous
experience as the IBC’s Brazilian representative at the
International Coffee Organization (ICO). In the same year,
Cooxupé directly exported 200,000 bags of coffee. In 2005, a
large part of the 3 million bags traded by Cooxupé, id est 1.4
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million bags, was directly exported (to 30 countries and 150
clients); 988,000 bags were indirectly sold and 630,000 bags
were traded on the domestic market.
Allied to the conscious and responsible consumption
movement, the increased demand for specialty coffees in the
early 2000s offered the opportunity to trade high-quality coffees
produced in a sustainable manner, at premium prices when
compared with the commodity market. In parallel to this, several
quality contests appeared in Brazil as a means of fostering the
production of quality coffees.
4.1.1. Gains in horizontal cooperation
Cooxupé’s initial strategy, id est eliminating intermediaries
in the commercial process and negotiating from a stronger
bargaining position, enabled it to obtain gains that resulted in
higher incomes for producers. As defined in section 3 of this
work, this strategy is called joint interdependence. Each
producer within a group makes an autonomous and well-
-defined contribution, and relationships between producers
are rare and generally without the need for strong social ties.
This represents a type of reduced-complexity problem relative
to the organizational structure, since it is decomposable. Prices
reflect the totality of the incentives required. Once the coffee
has been classified by the cooperative, its price is determined
by the market. The standardization process adopted by
Cooxupé was highly instrumental in solving problems of
information asymmetry. The producers’ major gains are related
to scale and scope when it comes to selling their coffee, the
joint purchase of inputs and the creation of knowledge and
management resources that, through the cooperative, enable
them to build partnerships with other companies that buy
quality products.
4.2. Sequential interdependence: illycaffè’s high quality brand
The case here portrayed concerns the strategy devised by
engineer Ernesto Illy, known as Dr. Illy, owner of a traditional,
family-owned Italian company – illycaffé – that is well-known
for its high quality espresso coffee. The high-quality brand
strategy was developed as an idea in the industrial segment,
but as will be seen, to be fully effective it required coordination
of the supply chain, id est producers would have to be engaged
in this strategy, thereby creating mutual interdependence
(SAES and ISHIKAWA, 2006). It is important to highlight that
the supply chain does not discriminate against a producer’s
size, which means that illycaffè’s suppliers come in a variety of
sizes.
There were two key drivers in Dr. Illy’s choice of strategy:
his experience in the company and his academic background.
Francesco Illy, Ernesto Illy’s father, founded illycaffé in 1933
in Trieste, Italy. Before taking over as co-owner and CEO of
the company in 1956, Dr. Illy had worked in several economic
sectors, but it was through his experience with clients that he
realized the extent to which consumers valued the consistency,
aroma and flavor of the beverage. In addition, his education in
chemical engineering fostered in him a high regard for
laboratory analyses of the drivers of quality in coffee, which
had been previously based on the subjectivity of specialists.
The alliance of these two types of knowledge enabled Dr. Illy
to visualize the potential of the high quality coffee business.
In 2006, illycaffé had some 40,000 sales outlets around the
globe, where over 5 million cups of espresso were served daily,
with its unique and always constant blend of nine origins of
Arabica (SAES and ISHIKAWA, 2006).
The illycaffè supplies 12 countries, benefiting from
differences found in climate and altitude conditions, among
other aspects. From June to October it purchases coffee from
Brazil and from January to May from Central American
countries, India and Ethiopia (NEVES, SAES and REZENDE,
2003). The company acquired some 200,000 bags of coffee
from Brazil in the 2006-2007 crop year. Though this is a large
quantity in terms of high quality coffee, it represents little if
compared to the country’s overall production of approximately
35 million bags, on average (CIC, 2008). In any case, the small
quantity bought by illycaffé in Brazil marked a change of history
for Brazil’s coffee production, as we shall see later.
Brazil is a strategic supplier to illycaffè. Besides being the
world’s largest coffee producer, from 65 to 70 per cent of
illycaffè’s raw material come from Brazil, because this is one of
the few countries that dry-processes coffee. This is an essential
method in the composition of the espresso, since sun-dried
coffee has a higher sugar content, caused by the migration of
sugars from the drying fruit to the coffee bean, which gives
more aroma and body to the blend (ZYLBERSZTAJN and
NEVES, 1997).
However, although illycaffè has bought Brazilian coffee
since 1933, it was only in the early 1990s that the company was
able to participate strongly in the acquisition of green beans.
This was justified because, before this time, Brazilian market
regulations from the IBC determined that the product could
only be exported by its accredited agents.
Allied to this fact, the way Brazilian coffee was sold – mixing
coffee of different qualities and from different regions – made
it hard for illycaffè to obtain its desired standard. Of the ten or
twelve coffee samples that reached Trieste only one would be
approved for purchase by illycaffè. Finally, because this
commercial practice in Brazil did not value the product that
was of a higher quality, producers stopped investing in quality
and the quality product was eliminated from the market.
The fall in international coffee prices in the early 1990s
mirrored a loss in quality, since decapitalized producers invested
minimally in post-harvest practices. In 1989 illycaffè had serious
supply shortages: of the 36 samples examined by Brazilian
exporters, not a single one was approved by the company.
Having identified the problem, Dr. Illy would now have to
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discover the opportunities arising from it. Worried about the
supply issue, he decided to come to Brazil to visit the coffee
producing regions and understand how the production and
marketing of the raw material were organized.
Contrary to his expectations, he was surprised by the high
quality of the coffee fruit on the tree. He was, however,
frustrated by the harvesting (stripping the cherries from the
branch by hand) and processing methods, which resulted in
beans at different stages of maturity being all mixed up in the
same batch. Dr. Illy saw that the main problem was the
coordination of the harvesting, drying, processing and trading
activities. Problems occurred because the agents involved were
not receiving adequate incentives to produce the quality he
needed.
The solution would not lie in acquiring properties and,
therefore, vertically integrating production: the quality of coffee
is influenced by weather conditions, which cause large varia-
tions in quality from region to region in a given crop.
The idea for solving the problem came when Dr. Illy
observed the strategy of the Italian fashion designer,
Ermenegildo Zegna. Faced with difficulties when it came to
buying quality cashmere, his company had created a quality
contest, offering financial incentives to communities that
supplied the best fabric (SAES and ISHIKAWA, 2006).
Replicating this strategy, in 1991 illycafè started to promote
an annual, Brazil Coffee Quality Prize for Espresso contest,
aimed at identifying the superior quality coffee produced in a
given year. As a prize the company pays a premium that is 20
to 30 per cent above international prices for good quality coffee
beans, and purchases the coffee beans that are thus classified.
The incentive structure enabled by the contest allows
illycaffè to identify the parties present in the transaction, which
is a relevant aspect in the product’s final result. In this case,
since the spot market was unable to coordinate transactions,
the hierarchical structure was replaced by an innovative solu-
tion (ZYLBERSZTAJN and NEVES, 1997).
The illycaffè quality contest changed the pattern of
competition in the coffee market. Producers realized that
Brazilian coffee, which was considered to be of average quality
in the international market, could be sold at a premium price
provided better harvesting practices and new commercial pro-
cesses were adapted.
The number of candidates for supplying coffee to illycaffè
increases every year. Through a multiplying effect, similar
contests have been adopted and regions that traditionally
produced low quality beans have sought new technologies to
improve their production processes. This happened, for
instance, in Minas Gerais’ Zona da Mata (forest zone), whose
coffee beans had been given a low score in the classification
(Rio Zona). After implementing a new technology for
processing the beans, local producers started to be classified
in quality contests (SAES, BOLDRINI JUNIOR and REZENDE,
2003).
Producers have an additional advantage when supplying
coffee to illycaffè: the positive externality of possessing an
implicit quality certification. Even if only a small amount of a
coffee grower’s production is sold to illycaffè, the status of
being a supplier allows for better negotiating conditions with
other suppliers.
This fact was observed in a survey conducted with pro-
ducers who supply to illycaffè, in which 83 per cent (of the 46
interviewees) declared that being an illycaffè supplier results
in gains in negotiations with other buyers, besides being a
general valorization of the coffee from a given place if the
region has been awarded prizes (SAES, BOLBRINI JUNIOR
and REZENDE, 2003).
4.2.1. Gains with vertical coordination
Consumers identify the illycaffè brand by the quality of its
espresso coffee. The brand’s reputation ensures the attributes
that consumers desire; they know that the company has
selected the best suppliers, no matter who they are. For this
reason, the company does not need to establish contracts or
establish a formal relationship with producers. The incentive
to produce quality is dictated by the market signals, indicating
that a premium price exists in comparison with the commodity
price.
Therefore, the relationship established between illycaffè
and producers is characterized by sequential interdependence.
Both the structure of the contest and the premium have led to
the creation of an elastic supply of quality product, thereby
bringing about an extremely efficient situation for the supply
chain. Competition in the market of factors produces the
participants’ maximum effort (those who do not strive are
expelled from the market). In addition to the premium price
indicated by the market, information systems were created,
thus providing producers with the technology needed to enable
them to increase the supply of high quality beans.
4.3. The experience of Poço Fundo’s producers
The next experience is about a successful case of small
family producer strategies providing for the aggregation of
income. The well-known case of Poço Fundo’s producers in
the coffee market is seen as a source of inspiration for other
communities that have tried to follow in their footsteps. The
municipality of Poço Fundo is located in the south of the state
of Minas Gerais. This location mainly comprises small family
farmers, with coffee representing 85 per cent of the population’s
income (SAES and MIRANDA, 2006; SOUZA, 2006).
Just as was seen in the previously presented experiences,
the 1990s crisis in the coffee market served as motivation for
20 small coffee farmers, led by Luís Adauto de Oliveira, a
technician in agriculture extension, to decide to create the
Cooperative of Small Producers from Poço Fundo and Region
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in 1991. The theme behind the innovative strategy was,
therefore, the same one that has driven the cooperative move-
ment worldwide: joining forces to improve the commercial re-
lationships of the municipality’s growers.
Luís Adauto’s facility for organizing collective actions
resulted from the experience he had accumulated from the
practice of sharing work in coffee crops with his neighbors –
mainly in communal harvesting tasks – called mutirão (worker
task forces). Like most producers from the region, Luís Adauto
is a small family farmer. With only the help of his wife, he works
his 6 hectares smallholding, producing some 180 bags of coffee
a year. At harvest time, families gather to harvest their crops.
Luís Adauto’s participation in the human rights organization,
the Land Pastoral Commission (Comissão Pastoral da Terra –
CPT), has also been an important source of learning for
improving his natural leadership skills and his communication
abilities with his peers.
However, the resources required to implement a strategy
involving the specialty coffee market did not form part of the
knowledge-base of the region’s producers, and much less
considering the Fair Trade market. In this case, a paramount
role was played by agricultural engineer, Sérgio Pedini, from
the Federal Agro-technical School (Escola Agrotécnica Fede-
ral – EAF) of Machado, who, interested in seeking solutions
for the region’s development, envisioned the strategy of
investing in the Fair Trade market, since the region’s producers
had the necessary requirements to do so (small-scale family
farmers associated into a cooperative).
Initially the Association, and then the Poço Fundo Family
Farmers Cooperative (Cooperativa dos Agricultores Famili-
ares de Poço Fundo e Região – Coopfam) that was founded
in 1993, had no great intentions. The cooperative’s aim was to
enhance the negotiating power of its members and raise their
income through gains in scale when purchasing inputs and
jointly trading coffee. However, the joint strategies arising from
the gains of the association only resulted in a small increase in
the income of these farmers. Right at the beginning eight
producers gave up participating in Coopfam. The low coffee
prices of the period contributed to their lack of interest. Luís
Adauto had identified a problem: the cooperative solution was
shown not to be achieving the aims for which it had been
created. The question was, therefore: Were there any oppor-
tunities to be extracted from this conclusion?
The partnership with the local technical school, which
started in the mid-1990s, ultimately proved to be essential in
positioning the selling of the producers’ coffee in more
profitable markets. At the time, researchers with the Federal
Agro-technical School of Machado were implementing local
development projects. One such project was the work of raising
the population’s awareness of the significance of creating a
market under fair conditions of solidarity for their coffee.
In 1996, cooperative associates started to show an interest
in the principles of organic agriculture, driven by the successful
experience of neighboring producers, particularly from the
Jacarandá farm, which introduced organic growing practices
into Brazil (SOUZA, SAES and DOLNOKOFF, 2005).
In 1997, the partnership with the EAF included two priority
actions. First, the EAF promoted a seminar on rural develop-
ment whilst concomitantly using resources from the Workers’
Support Fund (Fundo de Amparo ao Trabalhador – FAT) to
provide capacity-building related activities for groups of
farmers to empower them to effectively participate in the fair
trade market.
In the same year these farmers earned Fair Trade certi-
fication. Yet, despite this achievement, the cooperative was
unable to trade its coffee on the international market. Luís
Adauto attributes this to the existence of prejudice on the part
of international buyers, who saw Brazilian producers as large
landowners. In the case of the 196 associates of Coopfam,
they have rural areas no bigger than 12 hectares, the average
being 5 hectares.
The first negotiation to export coffee occurred in 2000, when
the International Conference on Organic Coffee and Fair Trade
was held in the city of Machado, sponsored by the EAF. This
event allowed the region to become known to the external
market, since it hosted some 400 interested participants and
representatives from several buying countries, like Australia,
China, Japan and Colombia. It was also seen that if producers
were to sell on the international market, they were expected to
have quality certifications that supported their organization
system in their target markets. The Ecological Certification
from the German BCS Öko Garantie label was their next
achievement. In 2001, the 75 families who had obtained this
certification made the first sale of 287 bags of coffee to the US-
-based Royal Coffee.
The result of this venture motivated other producers,
thereby raising the number of Coopfam’s associates. In 2006
the association had 196 members, who were exporting through
Brazilian exporters (Sancoffee from Santo Antonio do Amparo
and Exprinsul) to the Royal Coffee and Braser Wolthers
importers, which distribute coffee in the United States, Italy
and England. Poço Fundo’s coffee can be found in the Wal-
-Mart stores on the international market. The cooperative’s
annual export volume of 5-6,000 bags, however, does not allow
it to export directly (SAES and MIRANDA, 2006).
As provided for by the certification scheme, part of the
resource proceeds from coffee sales, corresponding to
US$0.05/lb (price per pound of coffee) has to be invested in
the community. As a consequence the following social projects
have been carried out in Poço Fundo: a school of informatics
has been built for producers, their children and needy children,
orthodontic and orthopedic treatment is being provided for
producers’ children and for needy children, along with dental
assistance for all cooperative members, an agro-forest organic
production system has been implemented and a home for the
elderly has been supplied. The cooperative also assists the
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community with the distribution of staple foods and school
materials. With these resources, Coopfam was also able to
have its own headquarters, with a warehouse for processing
and storing coffee.
The successful and innovative experience of these pro-
ducers has helped attract the attention of other partners and
collaborating centers, which maintains the continuity of the
resources, thereby creating a virtuous circle of investments.
4.3.1. Gains from horizontal and vertical coordination
The case of the producers from Poço Fundo started with a
mutual interdependence, since they have a brand to uphold.
In this case coffee is jointly traded, which requires shared
knowledge and actions. This is a more complex strategy, since
it requires engaging multiple agents in the transfer of know-
ledge and in developing a cognitive map. As a consequence,
the governance structure has to be aligned to this need for
knowledge transfer and responsibility among agents. The
structure was still being formed in 2008, insofar as the expe-
riences are recent and characterized by vertical and horizontal
interdependence.
5. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CASES
The gains and costs with specialty coffees in the three
experiences are presented in Table 3. Coopfam’s producers trade
nearly all of their production as specialty coffee. Only 5 per
cent of Cooxupé’s members sell specialty coffees, trading only
5.4 per cent of the coffee they produce as special. Among
specialty coffee producers, the ones associated with Coopfam
reported having the highest cost differential between specialty
and traditional coffees. Accounting for this is the fact that small-
-scale organic production uses fewer industrial inputs and only
family labor, which results in lower production costs. Therefore,
with the need for certification, the relative costs rise significantly.
Nevertheless, these are the producers who obtain the highest
price differential by virtue of their fair-trade certification.
The question running right through this article was whether
strategies, leading to the creation of differentiation attributes
in the rural segment, could ensure adequate rents for agri-
cultural producers. To that end, an analysis model was built
based on the strategic view of the Economic Theory of
Organizations, having the SCAs of the firms as the focus of
the analysis. Later, three cases were presented, aimed at
showing how the model could explain producers’ performance
in terms of rent appropriation.
As illustrated in Table 4, entrepreneurs (KTP) in each of
the cases presented have made different judgments on
business opportunities [1]. The solution to the problem posed
by each experience was related to the life histories of each
entrepreneur, as well as to what they learned from their own
business [2]. Depending on the type of problem to be solved
[3] new resource attributes had to be explored [4] and different
governance structures (TCE) required [5]. Finally, added to
the conditions of product market [6], the elements above-
-mentioned determine producers’ capacity to absorb rent [7].
Therefore, with the chosen governance structure aligned with
the resource profile, both value creation (SPA) and its appro-
priation (TCE) were simultaneously defined.
Taking the contemporaneous nature of these cases into
consideration, the results obtained in terms of short-run rent
appropriation remain unclear, although they do provide some
interesting reflections with regard to theories and public and
private policies.
In the case of Cooxupé’s strategy, good quality, consistency
and transparency in relationships with buyers in the inter-
national market were the attributes conquered through an
innovative system of standardization that, allied to the strategy
of increasing the number of associates, allowed the cooperative
to have volume and provide regular supplies. Setting up its
business model in the international market was made possible
through the development of human resources in the period of
tenure of entrepreneur Dr. Isaac, who played a pivotal role in
the creation of unique competences in his organization. Due
to the reduced complexity of the initial strategic solution –
Table 3
Production Of Specialty Coffee: Cost and Price Differences (2006/2007 Crops)
 Average of Coffee Traded
Cost Difference Between Special Price Difference Between Specialas a Specialty
and Traditional Coffee (%)  and Traditional Coffee (%)
Number of Producers % of Total
Cooxupé 5 (5%) 5.4 7.0 5.9
illycaffè 9 (100%) 48.2 9.4 19.0
Coopfam 9 (100%) 95.6 22.2 38.3
Source: Field survey (2007-2008).
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standardization and the sale of good quality coffee in the
international market – in which each one of its integrating
parts (rural producers) provides a discrete contribution to the
whole, we have joint interdependence. We have also seen that
the conditions for quasi-rent expropriation are nil, since coffee
is sold at the price set by the Liffe and CSCE. Gains, therefore,
arise from two factors: the minimization of transaction costs,
resulting from efficiency gains in negotiations, and economies
of scale and scope in the commercial process. In this case, the
firm will have SCAs, because it will be more efficient than its
current or potential rivals in the creation of value in the joint
production of standardized good quality coffee.
With regard to illycaffè, the attribute Dr. Illy explored was
quality excellence, which required the coordination of the
supply chain. To achieve excellent quality coffee, investments
were required in crop handling but, because the market did
not pay for them, they were not being made. Here we have an
moderately complex problem, because the decision centralized
by the firm (it holds residual decision rights) in the coordina-
tion process solves the problem by providing adequate in-
centives.
With regard to Poço Fundo’s producers, they were the ones
who obtained the biggest success in adopting value-appro-
priation strategies based on a relationship of mutual interde-
pendence. Two reasons account for this: they were the pioneers
in Brazil, taking the opportunity when the Fair Trade market
was still in formation, and they adopted a strategy that had a
well-defined focus on a buying market that was already
prepared. That was possible, not only because of entrepreneur
Adauto’s capacity to mobilize producers, but also because of
Table 4
Comparative Analysis of the Cases
Cases
Business opportunity [1]
Entrepreneur’s history and
learning [2]
Problem type concerning
knowledge transfer to
producer [3]
Resources created /
explored [4]
Governance structure:
horizontal / vertical [5]
Conditions of product
market [6]
Conditions for  value-adding
producers [7]
Cooxupé
• Good quality coffee of international
market standard for better trade
possibilities
• Background and vision of business
management in the secondary
sector
• Learning to focus on the business,
not diversifying
Low complexity:
• Create standardization (reputation
and transparency)
•  Motivate region’s producers to
become partners
• Standardization recognized at
international market level
• Knowledge of international market
• Capacity to explore economies of
scale and scope
• Joint Interdependence
• Coordinating agent: market
• Competitive market
• Large traders and exporters and
low margins
Nil:
• Gains from efficient relations,
economies of scale/scope and
reduction of transaction costs
illycaffè
• Market niche of espresso coffee
of excellent quality
• Degree in Chemical
Engineering
• Learning by understanding
consumer’s demand
Average complexity:
• Foster the production of quality
coffee aimed at decreasing
transaction costs
• Coffee brand of excellent quality
• Sequential interdependence
• Coordinating agent: authority
(firm)
• High income elasticity and low
demand elasticity
Average:
• Depends on negotiation
conditions
• Great possibility of quasi-rent
creation (brand)
Poço Fundo
• Fair Trade coffee for the
external market
• Experience in organizing
producers and the capacity to
absorb teaching from the
university
• Learning from producing/
negotiating organic coffee
High complexity:
• Joint production, id est
producers must be engaged in
producing Fair Trade coffee
(free riders may exist)
• Resources shared among all
agents
• Mutual interdependence
• Coordinating agent: certifier
• Regulated market: entry
barriers
High:
• While market is regulated
(cartel)
R.Adm., São Paulo, v.45, n.4, p.313-327, out./nov./dez. 2010 325
RENT APPROPRIATION AMONG RURAL ENTREPRENEURS: THREE EXPERIENCES IN COFFEE PRODUCTION IN BRAZIL
proximity to the university, which allowed for the transfer of
knowledge about the development of a cognitive map, with
several agents sharing the same strategy (investment in the
production of organic coffee).
6. CONSIDERATIONS ON THE RESULTS
The driving force of this work is the problem of the
decreasing trend of agricultural rent in the share of the total
amount generated by supply chains. The impoverishment and
exclusion of rural workers in poor countries, and the enormous
subsidies to producers in rich countries are dual aspects of
the same phenomenon faced by the 21st century economy. It
was argued that value creation and appropriation had to be
jointly determined, because the consistency of the strategy
does not only depend upon the characteristics of the sources
of value, but also on relationships between segments of the
supply chains. Therefore, the way the division of quasi-rent
takes place is based on the determinants of this relationship,
id est how property rights are allocated. The integrative
perspective of the views expressed in this work determined
that the value creation strategy (Ricardian/monopolistic rents)
must be aligned with the governance structure so that the
value created can be appropriated. The empirical analysis
looked at the Brazilian coffee market and discussed three
cases that have very distinct differentiation strategies. As has
been seen, each presented different opportunities and required
differentiated resource profiles, which, in their turn, determined
different vertical and horizontal governance structures. With
regard to the conditions of rent appropriation, our results were
very interesting, suggesting future reflections on private and
public strategies. 
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RENT APPROPRIATION AMONG RURAL ENTREPRENEURS: THREE EXPERIENCES IN COFFEE PRODUCTION IN BRAZIL
Rent appropriation among rural entrepreneurs: three experiences in coffee production
in Brazil
The purpose of this article is to answer the question of whether there are sustainable, economically feasible strategies
that can capture agricultural income. To this end, the body of work on why entrepreneurs choose value-capturing and
value-adding strategies is analyzed and then a model is built to analyze differentiation in the rural sphere. Four
theoretical perspectives are presented: Strategic Positioning Analysis, Resource-Based View, Transaction Cost
Economics, and Knight’s Profit Theory. Drawing on the model, three strategic experiences from the Brazilian coffee
agro-industrial system are examined, divided into three categories: joint interdependence, which presents the strategic
focus of value creation through direct exports of good quality coffee, by the Guaxupé Regional Cooperative of Coffee
Producers (Cooxupé); sequential interdependence, which examines the quality coffee brand strategy of the roasting
company illycaffè; and mutual interdependence, in which the experience of Poço Fundo producers, aimed at adding
value to coffee based on the sustainable coffee market, is analyzed. The most successful strategy in terms of
representation (number of producers involved) appears to be that which focuses on scale and scope in the marketing
of specialty coffees. Another interesting finding regards a new paradigm in the relations between the rural sector and
the downstream segment regarding beverage quality and sustainability issues.
Keywords: value-adding strategies, strategic positioning analysis, resource-based view,
transaction cost economics, Knight’s profit theory,
coffee agribusiness.
Apropiación de los ingresos por empresarios rurales: tres experiencias en la producción
de café en Brasil
La pregunta que guía este trabajo es si hay estrategias viables y sostenibles que permitan revertir la caída de los
ingresos agrícolas de los pequeños productores. Para responderla,  se analizan cuatro diferentes líneas teóricas:
Análisis de Posicionamiento Estratégico, Visión Basada en Recursos, Economía de los Costos de Transacción y
Teoría del Beneficio de Knight. Con base en un modelo propuesto, se examinan tres experiencias estratégicas adoptadas
en el sistema agroindustrial del café: interdependencia conjunta,  que presenta la orientación estratégica de creación
de valor en exportación directa de  café de buena calidad de la Cooperativa Regional de Cafeicultores de Guaxupé
(Cooxupé); interdependencia secuencial, que evalúa la estrategia de la marca de café de calidad de la torrefactora
illycaffè; interdependencia recíproca, en que se analiza la experiencia de los productores de Poço Fondo, con el fin de
añadir valor al café en el mercado de cafés sostenibles. Como resultado, la estrategia que obtuvo mayor éxito en
términos de representación es la que tiene foco en escala y alcance en la comercialización de cafés especiales o
diferenciados.
Palabras clave: estrategias para agregar valor, análisis de posicionamiento estratégico,
visión basada en recursos, economía de los costos de transacción, teoría de Knight,
agronegocio del café.
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